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We live in troubled times. U.S. military might and European economic 
expansion can scarcely hide the absence of any substantive accord among 
Western powers that have dominated the globe for several centuries. 
As America shifts its geo-strategic focus away from the Euro-Atlantic 
UHJLRQ WKH:HVWVHHPVLQFUHDVLQJO\VSOLWEHWZHHQ(XURSHDQDQG3DFL¿F
powerswith Russia stuck in a Eurasian gray zone. Without a shared 
ideology or overarching narrative, the various parts of the wider West are 
drifting apart. Indeed, there is a growing gap between an exceptionalist 
United States, a cosmopolitan European Union, and a reactionary Rus-
sia. Whereas America invokes the Puritan promise of a shining city on 
the hill and a beacon of democracy to all the nations, Europe pursues 
Rousseaus and Kants Enlightenment project of a post-national federation 
of states. Meanwhile Russia seems to follow the counter-Enlightenment of 
de Maistre and Herder, strengthening the national community against both 
IRUHLJQLQÀXHQFHDQGPLQRULW\ULJKWVFODLPV
In the 1990s and early 2000s, EU multilateralism and U.S. unipolarity 
displaced notions of state sovereignty in favor of liberal or neoconserva-
tive interventionism. However, as the United States and Europe turn away 
from their interventionist stance, the whole extent of the strategic void at 
the heart of the Western world is plain for everyone to see. Compared with 
its own historical unfolding or even the recent Cold War past, the West 
today looks bereft of ideas, deeply divided, and incapable of acting as a 
force for good. It was not supposed to be that way. After the demise of 
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the Soviet Union, successive U.S. administrations harbored ambitions of 
global hegemony with the complicit collusion of their European allies. But 
instead of a global convergence toward liberal market democracy, we 
are seeing the rise of old empires and new elites who combine bureaucratic 
capitalism with authoritarian plutocracy in a neoliberal-communistic 
hybrid.1
Amid global interdependence and volatility, Western countries oscil-
late between market anarchy and state coercion. They are eschewing 
global leadership and lasting involvement abroad in favor of manag-
ing risks from afar. Across the West there is a growing populist backlash 
against the dominant forms of globalization and a call to retreat to narrow 
national self-interest. With a general failure to lead by example, the global 
SRZHUYDFXXPZLOOEH¿OOHGE\H[WUHPLVWIRUFHVRIVHFXODUQDWLRQDOLVPRU
religious fundamentalismor, in some cases, both at once. As the bound-
aries between power and terror as well as wealth and crime are becoming 
EOXUUHG WKH ZRUOG QRZ H[KLELWV D JHQHUDO VOLGH LQWR RI¿FLDO FRUUXSWLRQ
corporate tyranny, the collapse of equity, and a disregard for the rule of 
lawto which the West is by no means immune. To retreat to an insular 
powerlessness in the face of these things would be to betray Western iden-
tity and incidentally threaten long-term security.
The only alternative to both chauvinist nationalism and abstract cos-
mopolitanism is to re-envision the West as something like a multi-national 
association that shares risks, rewards, and resources. This could be a 
voluntary agreement among participatory nations to offer minimum provi-
sions in both the economic and the social realms and also to meet certain 
shared standards of subsidiarity, or of decentralized control and respon-
VLELOLW\3DUWRI WKDWDUUDQJHPHQWFRXOGEHDSRROHGSURPLVHRI¿QDQFLDO
assistance under inspected control, if any nation found it hard to meet 
VXFKVWDQGDUGV$WUXHFRPPRQZHDOWKRIQDWLRQVZRXOGUHÀHFWDUHODWLRQDO
covenant among peoples where social and cultural ties shape our identity 
more than entitlements and contracts.
1. See Christopher Lash, The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy 
(New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1995); Paul Piccone, Confronting the Crisis: The Writings 
of Paul Piccone (New York: Telos Publishing Press, 2008); David J. Rothkopf, Superclass: 
The Global Power Elite and the World They Are Making (London: Little, Brown & Com-
pany, 2008); Alain Supiot, Grandeur and Misery of the Social State, New Left Review 82 
(JulyAugust 2013): 99113.
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1. The West beyond Secular Supercessionism
The West is commonly associated with one of two narratives: either the 
progressive unfolding of universal civilization that invented and instituted 
freedom, democracy, market economy, and human rights, or else a history 
of colonialism that led to violence, oppression, and capitalist domina-
tion across the globe.2 Both of these narratives seem to be diametrically 
RSSRVHGEXWVKDUHPXFKPRUHLQFRPPRQWKDQPLJKWEHDW¿UVWDSSDUHQW
First of all, they trace the origins of the West to antecedents in Antiquity 
and the Middle Ages, but they claim that the Western project only came to 
full fruition in the modern era when it exported its ideas and institutions 
to the rest of the worldfor good or ill. The long sixteenth century 
(ca. 14501650) assumes pivotal importance in the Wests ascendency to 
hegemonic status. 
Linked to this is a second point of convergence, notably that mod-
ern history superseded and ultimately replaced all preceding traditions. 
Such a structuring of historical narrative is based on the idea of absolute 
EUHDNVLQKLVWRU\²WKH¿QDOGHPLVHRIWKHHDVWHUQ5RPDQ(PSLUHLQ
when Constantinople fell to the Turks, or the discovery of the New World 
starting in 1492, or the 1555 Peace of Augsburg and the 1648 Treaty of 
Westphalia that ended the wars of religions, or again the French Revolu-
tion that abolished the collusion of clerical theocracy with monarchical 
absolutism. In this light, revolutions are seen as absolute ruptures with the 
past of which modern Western countries have been the vehicle.
Third, Western hegemony is connected with the fall of Catholic-Ortho-
dox Christendom and the rise of Protestant modernity, which is variously 
viewed as a harbinger of Enlightenment emancipation or as the source 
of supremacism. Either way, the secularizing effects of the Reformation 
are considered to be instrumental in shaping the Western-centric world as 
ZHNQRZLW7KLVLVUHÀHFWHGLQWKHVHFXODUVHWWOHPHQWRIWKH:HVWSKDOLDQ
system, which subsumes all institutions and practices under the absolute 
sovereignty of national states and transnational markets. 
Taken together, these three points of convergence suggest that the 
transition from Antiquity and the Middle Ages to the modern era was 
2. For recent statements of these narratives (with a particular focus on Britain), 
see, inter alia, Niall Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World, new ed. 
(London: Penguin, 2004); Niall Ferguson, Civilization: The West and the Rest (London: 
Penguin, 2012); Richard Gott, Britains Empire: Resistance, Repression and Revolt (Lon-
don: Verso, 2012).
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somehow exemplaryeither as a universal civilization that is compatible 
with a more global cosmopolitan (European) or a more national republican 
(U.S.) vision, or else as a particular tradition of colonialism that seeks to 
refashion the whole world in its own image. In short, modernity is con-
sidered to be both necessary and normative, whether as the beginning of 
the liberal culmination of history or the liberal transition to an eventual 
communist outcome.
Yet one can question this prevailing metanarrative of the West. First 
of all, it uncritically accepts the conventional periodizations of Antiquity, 
the Middle Ages, and modernity, which ignore deep continuities over 
timeincluding Greco-Roman law and participation in the polis/civitas, 
Christian constitutionalism and virtues of charity, or the shared tradition of 
religious freedom, free association, and the dignity of the person.3 If one 
takes these continuities into account, then one can tell a more balanced 
story that reveals how change and stasis are always complexly interwo-
ven. This is to embrace a more radical historicity that regards intellectual, 
VRFLDODQGSROLWLFDOGHYHORSPHQWVLQWHUPVRIWKHLUVSHFL¿FDOO\FRQWLQJHQW
cultural roots and their equally contingent, if habitually consistent, unfold-
ing both over time and across space.
Second, this metanarrative embraces a supercessionist model of his-
torical change that underpins the liberal and Marxist accounts of progress, 
which dominate both the humanities and the social sciences.4 Variants of 
progressivism are all part of the Whig interpretation of history that Her-
EHUW%XWWHU¿HOGUHEXWWHGVREULOOLDQWO\LQKLVHSRQ\PRXVERRN5 By treating 
WKHPRGHUQDVDQH[HPSOL¿FDWLRQRIKLVWRULFDOHYROXWLRQVXFKDSSURDFKHV
commit the fallacy of historicism that treats contingent events as necessary 
norms. 
Third, connected with this is the point that historicism rests on an ahis-
torical logic. The latter was invented by late medieval secular reason and 
3. See, inter alia, Brian Tierney, Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional 
Thought, 11501650 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1982); J. H. Burns, Introduction, in 
J. H. Burns, ed., Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge UP, 1988), pp. 18; Julia M. H. Smith, Europe after Rome: A New Cultural History 
5001000 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005), esp. pp. 151216, 25392; Francis Oakley, Natural 
Law, Laws of Nature, Natural Rights: Continuity and Discontinuity in the History of Ideas 
(New York: Continuum, 2005), pp. 87109.
4. Brad S. Gregory, The Unintended Reformation: How a Religious Revolution Secu-
larized Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2013).
 +HUEHUW %XWWHU¿HOG The Whig Interpretation of History (London: George Bell, 
1949).
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progressively instituted by the forces of Protestant confessionalization and 
the Enlightenment.6 In positing absolute historical breakswhich in reality 
were entirely avoidable, contingent, and arbitrarythis logic is unable to 
demonstrate its own presupposition that the passage from the Middle Ages 
to the modern era was somehow inevitable, necessary, and normative.7
Fourth, this sort of historicism treats history as a fated and all-deter-
mining teleological process based on certain iron laws. Precisely for this 
reason, the genuine alternative is not to opt for ahistorical, secular catego-
ULHVWKDWDUHVXSSRVHGO\XQLYHUVDOEXWUDWKHUWRIRFXVRQVSHFL¿FFRQWLQJHQW
developments. Far from being isolated events or absolute breaks in history, 
the emergence of the modern West was part of an era spanning the early 
fourteenth to the late seventeenth century, during which both ideas and 
practices already nascent during medieval times achieved fuller maturity 
and developed into the secular modern phase of the Middle Ages.8
Fifth, one can extend the critique of Protestant-liberal historicism and 
suggest that approaches centered on notions of long durée or cognate con-
cepts also lack historicity. The reason is that many late medieval features of 
the international system endured until the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ULHVDQGHYHQLQWHQVL¿HGLQVFRSH7KLVLQFOXGHVWKHFRPSOH[FRQQHFWLRQV
between central state coercion and global market exploitation, notably the 
possessive individualism of the social contract, agrarian surplus extrac-
tion, and piratical forms of trade.9 For these reasons, one can suggest that 
the modern Western system of national states and transnational markets 
PDUNHG DQ LQWHQVL¿FDWLRQ RI FHUWDLQ ODWHPHGLHYDO GHYHORSPHQWV UDWKHU
than a new phase of history.
6. John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond secular reason, 2nd ed. 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2006 [orig. pub. 1990]); Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard UP, 2007); Louis Dupré, Passage to Modernity. An Essay on the Hermeneu-
tics of Nature and Culture (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1993); Michael Allen Gillespie, The 
Theological Origins of Modernity (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2008).
7. Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Chris-
tianity and Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1993), and Formations of the Secular: 
Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2003).
8. See Adrian Pabst, The Secularism of Post-Secularity: Religion, Realism and the 
Revival of Grand Theory in IR, Review of International Studies 38, no. 5 (December 
2012): 9951017.
9. C. B. MacPherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to 
Locke (Oxford: Clarendon 1962); Robert Brenner, Merchants and Revolution: Commercial 
&KDQJH3ROLWLFDO&RQÀLFWDQG/RQGRQ¶V2YHUVHDV7UDGHUV± (London: Verso, 
2003); Benno Teschke, The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics, and the Making of Modern 
International Relations (London: Verso, 2003), esp. pp. 21575.
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Sixth, the logic that underpins the two dominant narratives about the 
West as a universal civilization or a particular form of colonialism is secu-
lar insofar as the Westphalian settlement of sovereign states is not limited 
to the functional differentiation of religious and political authority or the 
public settlement of the relationship between church and state that writes 
faith out of international relations. By subordinating faith to secular cat-
egories, the ideas that instituted Westphalia did not merely de-sacralize the 
public square. They reinvested it with quasi-sacred meaning by sacralizing 
secularitythe king, the nation, the state, the market, the individual, or 
the collective. As such, Western secularism does not so much mark the 
demise of faith or the exit from religion. Rather, it represents an alterna-
tive sacralitya secular capture of sanctity that, from a Judeo-Christian 
perspective, profanes the sacred and sacralizes the profane.
Seventh, the two dominant narratives about Western civilization 
and colonialism tend to privilege a narrow, modern secular prism at the 
expense of a metahistorical account that understands the West in light of 
its origins during the Axial Age. Simultaneously yet independently, a vari-
ety of different traditions in Persia, China, India, and the West produced 
profoundly transformative thinking in the period from 800 to 200 BC that 
provided the spiritual and intellectual source for humanity over the follow-
ing two millennia. The mark of the Axial Age was to fuse philosophy with 
religion in ways that, in case of the West, led to a synthesis of individual 
liberty with universal telos. In this manner, human agency in the imma-
QHQWRUGHURIEHLQJZDV IRU WKH¿UVW WLPH LQKLVWRU\ VHHQDVFRPSDWLEOH
with a transcendent outlook. This conception departed radically from both 
GHWHUPLQLVWLFIDWDOLVPDQGWKHLQGHWHUPLQDF\RIUDQGRPÀX[WKDWKDGFKDU-
acterized much of pre-Axial thinking. Linked to this was the rejection of 
political absolutism and moral relativism in favor of a plural universalism 
that blends particular practices with universal principles such as notions of 
the dignity of the person or the supernatural Good in God. 
7KH$[LDOV\QWKHVLVDOVRRXWÀDQNHGLQDGYDQFHWKHPRGHUQRVFLOODWLRQ
between metaphysical-political monism and dualism and closely con-
nected accounts of history that were either linear or cyclical. Indeed, the 
plural universalist vision of the Axial Age in the West shifted the emphasis 
away from historical narratives of either progress or decline, or else some 
cyclical alternation between both, to the paradox of fall and redemption
an upward spiral of vice and virtue rather than a linear or cyclical process 
LQYROYLQJWKHIRUFHVRIJRRGYHUVXVHYLOKRZHYHUGH¿QHG
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Finally and crucially, the West in its universal, metahistorical sense 
(rather than its narrow, modern meaning) marks the unfolding of this 
organic plural universalism. Unlike static dynasties in ancient Egypt or 
revolutionary regimes in the United States and France, the rest of the West 
is not self-foundational but instead marks the continuous unfolding of 
the Hellenistic fusion of Jerusalem with Athens and Rome.10 In the long 
Middle Ages (ca. 5001300), Hellenized Christianity integrated and 
transformed other European traditions such Germanic law, Celtic, Slavic, 
and other languages as well as cultural-social ties the wider Middle East, 
North Africa, and Eurasia. But already after the fall of imperial Rome in 
WKHODWH¿IWKFHQWXU\WKUHHGLIIHUHQWIRUFHVYLHGIRUWKH5RPDQOHJDF\DQG
VKDSHGWKH:HVW¶VHPHUJLQJFLYLOL]DWLRQ¿UVWSDJDQWULEHVIURP*HUPDQLF
Turkic, and Slavonic territories; second, Christendom and its ecclesial 
body of local parishes and transnational monasteries; and third, Islams 
creation of a caliphate from Arabia to the Iberian peninsula. Of these, as 
Rowan Williams writes, the Christian Church is quite simply the most 
extensive and enduring, whether in the form of the Western Papacy or 
of the Byzantine Commonwealth, the network of cultural and spiritual 
connections in Eastern Europe linked to the new Roman Empire centered 
on Constantinople.11 For this reason, all attempts to produce secular re-
readings of Western history are ahistorical and deny the enduring presence 
of Christianity throughout the modern, Enlightenment age.
In the wider West, the Axial Age and Christianity brought about a 
new polity that distributed both power and wealth between city-states, 
empires, and the Church.12 By contrast, modernity replaced the pooling of 
sovereignty with the single sovereign power of national states and trans-
national markets. Today we are seeing a resurgence of neo-medieval forms 
of political organization in a new guise, as the following section suggests.
10. See Adrian Pabst, Athens, Rome, and Jerusalem: A Reply to Luciano Pellicani, 
Telos 162 (Spring 2013): 16476.
11. Archbishop Rowan Williams, Religion Culture Diversity and Tolerance: Shap-
ing the New Europe, address given in Brussels, November 7, 2005, available online at 
http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/1179/religion-culture-diversity-and-
tolerance-shaping-the-new-europe-address-at-the-european-policy-centr. See also Dmitry 
Obolensky, The Byzantine Commonwealth: Eastern Europe, 500 (London: Sphere 
Books, 1974).
12. Pierre Manent, Les métamorphoses de la cité: Essai sur la dynamique de lOcci-
dent (Paris: Flammarion, 2010).
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2. Globalization and the Neo-Medieval Shape of International Affairs
The dominant model of globalization has established the primacy of the 
economic and the political over the social and the ethical. It has imposed 
rights and contracts at the expense of social ties and civic bonds. As a 
result, the economy and polity have been evermore uprooted from their 
traditional culture. Production and trade have been disembedded from 
VRFLHW\DQGVRFLDOUHODWLRQVUHHPEHGGHGLQDQLQFUHDVLQJO\DEVWUDFW¿QDQ-
cialized economy.13 Equivalently, short-term transactions take increasing 
precedence over long-term relationships. This logic both assumes and 
IXUWKHU HQJHQGHUV D SXUHO\ VHOIUHÀH[LYH UDQGRPO\ FKRRVLQJ LQGLYLGXDO
removed from the relational constraints and opportunities of nature, tradi-
tion family, and locality.
Crucially, the person is no longer regarded as the union of body and 
soul but, through a mechanization of Cartesian dualism, is divided into 
D PHUHO\ SK\VLFDO EUDLQ DQG D EDJ RI ERQHV DQG ÀHVK²HVVHQWLDOO\ MXVW
an amorphous mass of cells that can be manipulated at will by both the 
centralized national state and the globalized free market. If the individual 
as brain has ownership of this merely physical body, then he can freely 
alienate it. For this reason, capitalism has long assumed that one could sell 
ones labor while reserving ones person, which means that the employer 
of ones labor need have no regard for that personhood.14 Equivalently, 
according to the same biopolitical logic, the Republic has no regard for 
the citizen save as citizen, which is the dark reverse face of his supposed 
enlightened power to set up the state with others through a formal social 
contract (as for Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, or Kant).
So the serf or guildsman appears less absolutely free, yet by virtue 
of his collective belonging through his own body to the corporate body 
is treated in the round as a person by his master or colleagues. Likewise 
the subject of a Crown is not part of creating the kingdom, yet in being 
subjected to the monarch is recognized as a human subject or a person 
DQGLVLQGHHGWKHUHE\IXUWKHU³VXEMHFWL¿HG´RU³SHUVRQL¿HG´%\FRQWUDVW
to be a mere worker or citizen means always to be REMHFWL¿HG. And in 
either case, ownership of ones own body is always partitioned and the 
aspect belonging to the market or the state is always homogeneously com-
pounded with other bodies to make one single manipulable mass.
13. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Economic and Political Origins of 
Our Time (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944).
14. See Supiot, Grandeur and Misery of the Social State, pp. 99113.
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7KLVSURFHVVRIREMHFWL¿FDWLRQKDVEHHQWDNHQPXFKIXUWKHULQUHFHQW
times and has been much assisted by the dominant model of globaliza-
tion, which permits a further degree of remote control of both isolated 
mental decisions and human bodies. And with the loss of integral persons 
has gone the loss of the centrality of substantive justice. Since the per-
son is reduced to the randomly choosing subject, the virtue of justice gets 
replaced by formalist, procedural norms and values of impartiality and 
fairness that are centered on individual rights and entitlements. Equally, 
globalization reduces democracy to a set of procedures such as free 
elections and promotes an impoverished utilitarian ethic that maximizes 
private choice and the pursuit of personal pleasure. The ancient notion of 
happiness as eudaimoniaZKLFKPHDQV WKHÀRXULVKLQJRI WKHSHUVRQ LV
WKHUHE\UHFRQ¿JXUHG$OOWKLVEUDFNHWVTXHVWLRQVRIWKHVXEVWDQWLYHFRP-
mon good altogether out of the picture.
However, there is another possibility. This is that transport and com-
munications could truly provide the preconditions for the emergence of 
a global village, in which social bonds and cultural ties really do embed 
economic transactions and political cooperation. The current mode of 
globalization mostly destroys locality and interpersonal relationships 
by subordinating all interactions to formalistic, procedural standards of 
individual rights and commercial contract and by regarding local taste 
and custom as irrelevant. But globalization also renders it more and more 
possible for one community, locality, and even region to communicate 
directly with another in a totally distant part of the world. In this way it just 
could once more come to seem common sense that the entire economy 
VKRXOGEHVXERUGLQDWHWRVRFLDOUHFLSURFLW\DQGWKDWWKHSROLW\UHÀHFWVWKH
relational nature of humankindincluding the complex ties of family, 
community, profession, and faith.
Nor is this a mere possibility on the theoretical horizon. Globaliza-
tion has already transformed the secular settlement of national states and 
transnational markets bequeathed to us by the Westphalian system. In a 
sense we now live in a neo-medieval era insofar as we have outlived the 
dominant sway of national states and to some extent of undifferentiated 
markets. Viewed from a wide historical perspective (approximately 5,000 
years), the era of sovereign nation-states is very short (less than 500 years) 
and exceptional compared with the relative norm of imperially organized 
systems with gradated polities that rest on different kind of suzerainty. 
The latter describes formal or semi-formal relationships of supremacy and 
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subordination that are situated somewhere between the absolute equality 
of independent sovereign states and the direct rule of repressive colonial 
powers.
Even if the dominant modern institutional legacy will endure for some 
time to come, the exceptional era of the Westphalian settlement appears 
to draw to an end.15 We seem to have entered an interregnum in which the 
shape of things to come is best described as neo-medieval.16 Far from indi-
cating a return to, or repetition of, the Middle Ages, this notion suggests 
D UHYHUVLRQ WR ORQJVWDQGLQJSDWWHUQV WKDW UHÀHFW WKH VRFLRFXOWXUDO UHDOL-
ties in which forms of political and economic organization are grounded. 
Most critics of neo-medievalism in IR have adopted a curiously literalist 
interpretation that posits some kind of identity or equivalence between the 
Middle Ages and our present situation, which would be guilty of the same 
ahistorical logic as secular supercessionism. 
However, to say that the contemporary world is not the same as the 
Middle Ages does not mean that the notion neo-medieval is redundant. 
On the contrary, it can be used as a metaphor that helps both political 
thought and IR theory break out of conventional conceptual frames and 
that opens up new possibilities of recognizing alternatives to the sovereign 
power of both national states and global markets. Such alternatives include 
hybrid institutions, overlapping jurisdictions, polycentric authority, and 
forms of multi-level government or governance, which are all character-
ized by disperse and diffuse power structures and degrees of suzerainty 
that are not captured by modern paradigms of sovereignty and balance of 
power.
Signs abound that contemporary international affairs exhibit a neo-
medieval shape. The three political forms that characterize the West 
from Antiquity to the late Middle Agesthe City, the Empire, and the 
Churchare all resurgent in new ways. Big cities are often trading more 
with other cities across the globe rather than with towns or regions within 
their national borders. This is not only true for old and new city-states 
such as Singapore, Hong Kong, or Dubai and indeed long-established 
15. See, inter alia, Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, The End of Sovereignty? The 
Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1992); Robert 
Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century (London: 
Atlantic Press, 2003).
 7KHFOXHLVLQWKHSUH¿[³QHR´ZKLFKH[SOLFLWO\H[SUHVVHVWKHQRYHOFKDUDFWHURI
the contemporary situationnot some identical repetition of, or linear continuity with, an 
earlier arrangement during the Middle Ages.
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metropolises like London, New York, or Tokyo but also applies to new 
mega-citiesincluding Nairobi, Rio de Janeiro, Mexico-City, Kuala 
Lumpur, or Jakartanot to mention the booming metropolitan areas in 
China and India.17
As Benjamin Barber suggests, [t]he nation-state is failing us on the 
global scale. It is utterly unsuited to interdependence. The city, always the 
KXPDQKDELWDWRI¿UVWUHVRUWKDVLQWRGD\¶VJOREDOL]LQJZRUOGRQFHDJDLQ
become democracys best hope.18 Barber writes off the state too hastily 
and ignores the need to think cities in relation to their natural, rural envi-
ronment, but his point about the rise of autonomous cities as powerhouses 
of political transformation is surely right. The resurgence of global cities 
witnesses to the general rural exodus that reinforces the divide between 
urban and rural areas, but it also offers new opportunities to build more 
horizontal relationships between individuals, groups, and communities 
that are not subject to central state control.
Similarly, the global resurgence of religion is much remarked-upon 
but little understood. There is no return to faith, as if it had ever gone away. 
Rather, the intellectual and moral collapse of secularism provides new 
opportunities to rethink religion in international affairs in non-secularist 
ways.19$PLGWKHJOREDOÀRZRILGHDVDQGSUDFWLFHVLWLVRIWHQUHOLJLRXV
ties that bind together persons and communities both within and across 
national borders. Unlike the impersonalism of rights and contracts, the 
bonds of faith can nurture the kind of trust and cooperation on which soci-
eties ultimately depend. Globalization has reinforced formal connections 
RIEXUHDXFUDWLFFRQWURODQGFDSLWDOLVWFRPPRGL¿FDWLRQEXWLWKDVDOVRSUR-
moted new religious networks. Scott Thomas puts this well: 
[T]he global and the local are becoming more closely linked together 
in a kind of global particularity. One key example is . . . globalized 
Islam, in which types of radical Islam around the world blur the connec-
WLRQEHWZHHQ,VODPDVSHFL¿FVRFLHW\DQGDVSHFL¿FWHUULWRU\$QRWKHU
example is the transnational links between churches and denominations 
that make up global evangelical and Pentecostal Christianity. . . . These 
JOREDOOLQNVRUQHWZRUNVGRQRWMXVWKDSSHQWKH\DUHQRWIUHHÀRDWLQJ
but are social networks, embedded in religious diaspora communities 
17. See, inter alia, Saskia Sassen, Cities in a World Economy (London: Sage, 2011).
18. Benjamin R. Barber, If Mayors Ruled the World: Dysfunctional Nations, Rising 
Cities (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2013).
19. Pabst, The Secularism of Post-Secularity, esp. pp. 100317.
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that are a key aspect of religious transnationalism. . . . [S]uch social and 
information networks have been part of much of human history, and a 
part of the main world religions for centuries, and existed long before the 
modern international system.
20
Finally, the Westphalian idea of equality between sovereign states has 
turned out to be a bit of a myth. Amid the shift in power from the west 
and the north to the east and the south, global geopolitics is marked by 
the crisis of the nation-state and the resurgence of pre-modern empire, 
besides and sometimes along with a new permutation of the modern, colo-
nizing empire. One can approach this matter by noting that the core UN 
principle of national self-determination and territorial integrity along with 
non-interference in internal affairs is not really compatible with the new 
UN doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). So, on the one hand, ever 
smaller territorial entities can break away from their larger parent country 
in the name of the right to self-ruleSouth Sudan, Kosovo, South Ossetia, 
to name but the most recent cases. Perhaps in consistency with this, R2P 
has been used to protect populations from the brutal force of tyrannical rul-
HUVVXFKDV&RO*DGGD¿¶VLPPLQHQWRQVODXJKWRQWKHSHRSOHRI%HQJKD]L
LQ%XWOHVVFRPSDWLEO\LWKDVDOVRVHUYHGDVDMXVWL¿FDWLRQIRUUHJLPH
change encouraged (and sometimes brought about) by greater powers that 
enjoy an effectively quasi-imperial sway. The 2011 intervention in Libya 
encapsulates this ambivalence. Here the modern state is in tension both 
with imperial traditions that have long modern and pre-modern roots and 
also with contemporary realities that cannot be navigated with a merely 
Westphalian compass.
So the spread of globalized capitalism has led to a paradoxical com-
bination of national fragmentation and imperial consolidation, which 
complicates any post-Soviet and colonial idea of an end of history or 
worldwide convergence toward liberal market democracy. In the cat-
egory economically imperial belong global capital movements and 
supranational institutions like the IMF or the WTO, which represent a 
pooling of economic and political sovereignty that constrains the power 
RIVWDWHV0HDQZKLOHDQHZSROLWLFDOLPSHULDOLVPLVH[HPSOL¿HGE\SRZHUV
as diverse as Turkey, Iran, Russia, and China. Their leaders look back 
WR SUHPRGHUQ LPSHULDO WUDGLWLRQV LQ RUGHU WR GH¿QH QDWLRQDO UROHV LQ D
20. Scott M. Thomas, Religions and Global Security, Quaderni di Relazioni Inter-
nazionali 12, no. 2 (2010): 421 (quotes at pp. 10, 12).
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multi-polar world and forge links independently of Western countries 
and institutions. This is why Moscow speaks of its post-Soviet sphere of 
privileged interests and Beijing considers Taiwan as a renegade region 
that must be reintegrated into the Middle Kingdom. Equally Tehrans 
power projection across the wider Middle East is raising fears of revived 
Persian imperial ambitions.
In line with the same trend, Ankaras assertive foreign policy has 
transformed Turkeys role from being a bridge between Europe and Asia 
WRH[HUFLVLQJKHJHPRQLFLQÀXHQFHLQWKHODQGVWKDWIRUPHUO\FRQVWLWXWHG
the Ottoman empire. Cuneyt Zapsu, an adviser to the Turkish Prime Min-
ister Erdogan, was quoted as saying that We are the Ottomans successor 
and should not be ashamed of this.21 Indeed, the governing AKP partys 
foreign policy strategy has been described as a double-gravity state that 
seeks to balance its shared values as a member of the Euro-Atlantic com-
munity with its interest in the Greater Middle Eastern neighborhood.22 
Taken in combination these attitudes compose a neo-imperial outlook
the revival of Ottoman traditions novelly borne by newly self-assertive, 
Great Power Turkey, which seeks to act as an imperial force rather than 
a modern nation-state.
The resurgence of old imperial powers is not limited to these four 
emerging markets. Across the globe we are seeing the rise of ancient 
HPSLUHVRU WUDQVQDWLRQDOSROLWLFDOFRQ¿JXUDWLRQV WKDWQHYHUGLVDSSHDUHG
entirely. In Latin America, Brazil is exercising a continental leadership 
role. In Africa, countries such as Nigeria and South Africa deploy cross-
tribal and cross-cultural linkages that project their power well beyond 
their national borders. In Southeast Asia, Indonesia and the Philippines are 
HQJDJHGLQVWUXJJOHVWRVHFXUHWKHLUUHVSHFWLYH]RQHVRILQÀXHQFH,QWKH
0LGGOH(DVWWKHJURZLQJFRQÀLFWEHWZHHQWKH6DXGLOHG6XQQLDUFDQGWKH
Iranian-led Shia crescent shows just how dangerous the revival of imperial 
power can be when allied to a sectarian struggle whose origins go back 
to Islams formative period. None of these developments can be captured 
either by the realist focus on sovereign states, or by the liberal emphasis on 
21. This is set out in the 2001 book Strategic Depth (Stratejik Derinlik) by Turkeys 
ORQJVHUYLQJIRUHLJQPLQLVWHU$KPHW'DYXWR÷OXDVZHOODV LQKLVDUWLFOH³7KH&ODVKRI
Interests: An Explanation of the World (Dis)Order, Journal of International Affairs 2, 
no. 4 (December 1997February 1998).
22. See Philip Robins, A Double-Gravity State: Turkish Foreign Policy Reconsid-
ered, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 33 (November 2006): 199211.
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inter-state relations, or indeed by the cosmopolitan accentuation of post-
national identity. All three approaches view the modern state as given and 
underplay the importance of social, cultural, and religious ties that precede 
modern statehood and endure in international affairs.
3. Imperial Power and Liberal versus Associative Interventionism23
Political power tends to become ultimately imperial for three distinct yet 
related reasons. First of all, to stabilize volatile backyards, for example 
the United States in Central and Latin America, or China in the South 
China Sea, or Turkey and Russia in the wider Caucasus and Eurasia, or 
indeed the EU in the Balkans. Second, to secure natural resources and 
market outlets, for instance the EUs trade agreements with Africa and 
the West, or Chinas expansion in Africa and Latin America, or Russias 
proposed Eurasian Economic Union. Third, to pursue a civilizing mis-
sionwhether the U.S. export of democracy by hard and soft power, 
or the EUs promotion of human rights, or Chinas neo-Confucian project 
of global harmony. Of these, the EU is perhaps the best example of a neo-
medieval empire that seeks to project normative power by syndicating its 
values worldwide.24
If power is ultimately imperial, then the question is what this means 
for relationships between empiresold or newand other countries. 
Arguably, there is a choice between forms of colonialism and exploita-
tion, whether through direct conquest or indirect control, on the one hand, 
and more virtuous forms of protection and cooperation, on the other hand. 
,Q WKH¿UVWFDVHZHFDQVHHDQ LOOXVWUDWLRQRI WKHSDUDGR[RI WKH³IUHH´
laborer and free citizen, as Justin Rosenberg pointed out.25 Colonies are 
liberated along with their citizens but in reality into a more absolute 
mode of contractual slavery at the hands of new internationally oligarchic 
masters (both states and corporations) who are more indifferent to their 
true well-being than even the more avowed masters of the colonial past. 
Rosenbergs analysis (and his Marxism) is here more rigorous than that of 
much post-colonial writing.
23. This section draws on material from a book I am currently co-writing with John 
Milbank.
24. Jan Zielonka, Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 2006); and Europe as a Global Actor: Empire by Example? Inter-
national Affairs 84, no. 3 (2008): 47184.
25. Justin Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of 
International Relations (London: Verso, 2001), pp. 15779.
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Thus contemporary great powers operate a tributarian system with 
smaller neighbors and other states across the world. They provide military 
security in exchange for market outlets and inexpensive imports. For 
example, the United States sells military equipment to its allies world-
widenotably smaller imperial powers such as India or Saudi Arabia but 
also client states like Egypt and Pakistan. At the same time, it buys cheap 
consumer goods from abroad in order to fuel a consumption binge that 
papers over growing income and asset inequalities, while also importing 
cheap (often unskilled and illegal) labor to maintain a young population 
and keep wages low.
For its part, China needs primary commodities to sustain its buoyant 
economic growth, which it extracts in the resource-rich regions of Africa 
and Latin America. Beijing has also established a system of client states 
that provide either cheap sweatshops (e.g., Vietnam and Cambodia) or 
market access for its cheap consumer goods. In the new Great Game, the 
JHRHFRQRPLFVRIHQHUJ\DQG¿QDQFLDO VHFXULW\PDWWHUV MXVWDVPXFKDV
the geopolitics of territorial control. Instead of national states and liberal 
market democracy, we are seeing the rise of old empires and new elites 
who combine bureaucratic capitalism with authoritarian plutocracy in a 
neoliberal-communistic hybrid.26
Faced with this system, there is an urgent need for a much more 
equitable and more cooperative approach to international affairs, which 
can replace liberal interventionism and neoconservative crusades with 
an associationist interventionism upholding genuine transnational 
trusteeship and partnership in a fashion that respects local peculiarities 
and traditions. This is preferable to either an isolationism or supposedly 
principled non-interventionism of a pure realist stamp, which is now 
either dangerous or impossible or indeed both at once.
In international relations, the notion of trusteeship describes a relation-
ship in which one state, country, or nation assumes responsibility for the 
VHFXULW\DQGÀRXULVKLQJRIDQRWKHUVWDWHFRXQWU\RUQDWLRQWKDWLVWKRXJKW
to be) unable to manage its own affairs without doing damage either to 
itself or others.27 In the contemporary world, there are many cases where 
WKLVPLJKWDSSO\²LQFOXGLQJWUDQVLWLRQHFRQRPLHVSRVWFRQÀLFWFRXQWULHV
or failed states. In the absence of trusteeship, there is always the strong 
26. See references in note 1.
27. William Bain, Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and the Obligations of 
Power (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003).
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ULVNWKDWSXUHO\VHOILQWHUHVWHGSRZHUVZLOO¿OOWKHYDFXXP7KHUHE\WKH\
will ensure that a priggish absolutism with regard to national boundaries 
produces not the best but the worst, and not even a compromise, which 
associationist interventioncommitted to a cooperative approach but 
not to all and every tolerance of the behavior of the otheris more likely 
to achieve.
Associationist approaches would assume that the international system 
is not so much a society of sovereign states (as in the work of the English 
School, especially Hedley Bull and Barry Buzan) but rather a society of 
nations and peoples who are bound together by social ties and cultural 
bonds that are more primary than state-guaranteed rights and market con-
tracts. Up to a point, this is true of the countries that compose the British 
Commonwealth, other members of the Francophonie, or the association 
of Ibero-American states, or even certain parts of the post-Soviet space.
Such advocacy is by no means unmindful of the danger that the virtue 
RIFRRSHUDWLYHDVVLVWDQFHFDQ³ÀLSRYHU´DQGWXUQLQWRWKHYLFHRIRSSUHVVLYH
tutelage. This is true for all relationships that include forms of hierarchical 
dependenciesfrom the family via communities and states to the inter-
national society of nations and peoples. However, the risk of exploitative 
GRPLQDWLRQLVFRXQWHUEDODQFHGE\WKHSXUVXLWRIPXWXDOÀRXULVKLQJZKLFK
can only be sustained by an equally shared vision of a substantive common 
good in which all can share. Without this common pursuit, one is left with 
the formalist vacuum of a purely legal and contractual equality that inexo-
rably engenders its own substantive opposite, namely, the domination of 
the powerful and the wealthy. With associationist interventionism the 
latter is an admitted risk, but with the apparently greater radicalism of a 
non-paternalist liberalism, the risk is rather an inevitability. For liberalism, 
different degrees of development remain in the end but the outcome of 
chances in a game played according to fair rules, and therefore they are 
ultimately a matter of indifference. But for a post-liberal associationism, 
shared virtue permits of a common horizon of human concern between 
richer and poorer who may well be richer in depth of life, while the open 
advocacy of virtuous guardianship ensures that no relative failure con-
signs one to biopolitical unconcern. 
But to realize this requisite, even in any degree, would require some 
progress toward the genuine practice of international government, inter-
national policing, and the international rule of law. And this cannot be 
done merely in the name of acting for humanity or the cause of human 
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rights. For the problem with a lot of Western interventions in the Near 
East or North Africaas in the case of the 2011 regime change in Libya, 
for exampleis that if you are only intervening on that basis you will not 
possess a more concrete plan of medium-term trusteeship, which though it 
might involve something more paternalistic, could also prove to be of far 
more sympathetic use.
For in effect recent interventions in the Near East can all be construed 
as either too much or too little. If we are to avoid always saying too 
much in the name of a realist purism, then surely we must inevitably be 
putting an arbitrary block on our ethical sympathies and imperatives in 
the name of that debatable absolute which is the nation. But any inter-
vention is likely to remain an irresponsible too little if more powerful 
nations are not prepared to engage in long-term strategic assistance. And 
here an admittedly problematic paternalism is greatly mitigated by the fact 
that any substantive assistance would have to take seriously local customs 
and habits and not override them in the name of democracy and rights, 
whose status can never have the absolute and eternal ring of justice or 
the human good.
But this sort of thick international engagement cannot be delivered 
by a formal alliance of nations sharing only abstract liberal principles in 
common, as the Catholic metahistorian Christopher Dawson already real-
ized in relation to the former League of Nations.28 Such an organization, 
OLNHWKDWRIWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQVVXIIHUVDGRXEOHGH¿FLWGRXEO\OLQNHG7KH
merely formal principles prevent it from communicating any substantive 
vision of a desirable political and cultural way of life, while the merely for-
mal alliance of powers ensures that it lacks any power of real enforcement. 
The mutual linkage arises because principles of themselves engender no 
concrete unity or power, while contract divorced from a power of enforce-
ment (which always proceeds from a more concrete, ineffable unity) is 
generative of no concrete agreement.
For these reasons, either the UN has been paralyzed by the veto power 
of one of the permanent members of the Security Council, or else the 
power of the UN has been in reality the power of the United States (or in 
the future, perhaps China). That power is not bad in itself, and might in 
theory have been exercised in terms of its often hidden and perhaps deeper 
28. Christopher Dawson, The Judgement of the Nations (New York: Sheed and Ward, 
1942).
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associational genius. But unfortunately the United States and other West-
ern powers, such as the UK since the 1990s, have sought to impose on 
other countries merely formalistic and economistic principles that derive 
from their own theory of themselves more perhaps than from the truth 
of the way they have worked in practice. The West has offered this thin 
gruel rather than the solid sustenance of a deep-rooted Western culture 
with which other cultures might enter into conversation. And since culture 
abhors a vacuum, the formalism is in reality complicit with the offer of 
pop music and a permanent lust for the ephemeral.
Ever since the Wilsonian and Weimar era of the 1920s, it is this mode of 
liberal imperialism that has taken the global initiative. But in that era such 
a commitment to the empty freedom of culture taken as human choice 
as such generated its dialectical counterpart of totalitarian commitment 
WRPHUHO\PDWHULDORU³DQLPDO´YDOXHVRIELRORJLFDOÀRXULVKLQJ²ZKHWKHU
materialist or racial. And it can be noted that this commitment still 
augmented the cultural human will as a general will, while concomi-
tantly the liberal democracies pursued evermore a biological control of 
their own populations.
Today it may be that just the same dialectic is at work, as liberal-
ism once more automatically produces various totalitarian reactions (of 
course in new mutations), while on the other hand the contrast of liberal 
and totalitarian modes of the biopolitical is somewhat less apparent. For 
in either case neoliberal market and bureaucratic oligarchy imposes an 
economistic mediation between a massive spectacular authority on the one 
hand, and an appearance of individual choice on the other. At the same 
time the authoritarian market-state polices any aberrantly real choices 
with an ever-increased surveillance. Not accidentally, this double idiom 
can be parodied by large criminal consortia, as in Mexico and indeed 
elsewhere.29 
,IWKHFRQWUDVWEHWZHHQOLEHUDODQGWRWDOLWDULDQLVEHLQJTXDOL¿HGLQD
globalized era, and partly for reasons of increased abstraction and dialecti-
cal merging of far and near, then so too is the contrast between licit and 
illicit, in the same context and for the same reasons. Today power and 
crime are very often entangledboth reciprocally reinforcing through 
29. On the simultaneous expansion of the capitalist and the black market, see Nils 
Gilman, Jesse Goldhammer, and Steve Weber, Deviant Globalization: Black Market 
Economy in the 21st century (New York: Continuum, 2011).
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mutual refusal and through covert collaboration. It is possible to read the 
phenomenon of political terror, which is again perpetrated by both states 
DQGRXWODZVDV LQRQHUHVSHFWDQ LQWHQVL¿FDWLRQRI WKLVVLWXDWLRQ,Q WKH
case of both organized crime and organized terror, one has a terrible fusion 
of archaic but now dispossessed tribal and other archaic factions with all-
too modern aims, procedures, and discourses.30
7KH QHZ WULSOH WKUHDW RI RI¿FLDO DQDUFK\ FULPH DQG WHUURU PD\ EH
one reason why certain modes of religion are now once more to the fore. 
We cannot quite allow either individual anarchy or collective power to be 
the ultimate principle, without admitting that we are now under the sway 
of a post-modern, post-historical, post-metaphysical, and post-theological 
animalistic anarchyeven though that is indeed the case. Therefore, 
to avoid this conclusion, voluntaristic modes of beliefwhether Sunni 
Islamic or Christian Evangelicalclaim that legitimacy derives from 
some sort of hidden providential (rather than ethical) mediation between 
the individual or locally communal self-interested actor, on the one hand, 
and political collectivities, on the other hand. In this way, essentialist, rac-
ist, biopolitical identities, such as the Arab or the Anglo-Saxon worlds, 
get re-construed as providential totalities bearing the secret of private 
salvation.
At the same time, rigid revealed codes of mainly private personal 
conduct serve to ensure at least some boundary against incipient anar-
chy and some residual sphere in which people will be restrained by that 
degree of discipline which remains necessary to market performance. The 
latter is in varying degrees fused with the operation of the pleasure prin-
ciple beyond anything foreseen by Weber and even the Frankfurt School. 
Indeed, if work is now also pleasure (both mainly involve the virtuality 
RIF\EHUVSDFHWKHQVLJQL¿FDQWO\FKDULVPDWLF&KULVWLDQLW\HQGRUVHVWKLV
equivalence at a more elevated level with its blending of piety and ecstasy. 
Perhaps the Islamic equivalent is one-sidedly to do with insistence at once 
upon the duties and the pleasurable rewards of the Muslim male.
The postmodern era (tentatively beginning after World War I), beyond 
the sway of the nation-state and its extension into national empires, is 
30. See Akbar S. Ahmed, The Thistle and the Drone: How Americas War on Terror 
Became a Global War on Tribal Islam (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2013). 
+RZHYHUWKLVERRNLVQRWVXI¿FLHQWO\FULWLFDORIFHUWDLQ0XVOLPWUDGLWLRQVWKDWDUHFRPSDW-
ible and complicit with Islamic fundamentalism.
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therefore the era of liberal empire collusive with totalitarianism and the rise 
of ersatz, voluntaristic religion. Prior to that one had the age of Christian 
empire and prior to that again the age of pagan empires. Every human 
age has been an age of empires, in a way that the phrase post-imperial 
may all too easily ignore.31 Similarly, one tends to overlook the fact that a 
QDWLRQVWDWHLVHYHU\ELWDVPXFKDSURGXFWRIRULJLQDODQGRIWHQXQMXVWL¿-
able violence as is every imperial formation.32
4. Commonwealth and Covenant
To avoid both neo-isolationism and neo-colonialism, the alternative of 
associationist intervention requires an account of virtuous imperial 
power. Here the notion of commonwealth is key, as it is a central concept 
in realism, cosmopolitanism, and other traditions of both political thought 
and IR theory. In Leviathan, Hobbes distinguishes commonwealth by free, 
contractual institution from commonwealth by forceful, violent acquisi-
tion. But in either case, creating a commonwealth marks the imposition 
RIDQDUWL¿FLDOSROLWLFDORUGHURQ WKHYLROHQW VWDWHRIQDWXUH33 Hobbess 
anthropology leads him to view mankind as essentially atomized and vio-
lence as more fundamental than peace. Thus the polity is governed by will 
DQGDUWL¿FHQRWWKHLQWHOOHFWDQGWKHUHDOQDWXUHRIWKLQJV7KLVQRPLQDOLVW
and voluntarist ontology underpins the realism that is commonly associ-
ated with Hobbess political thought.
Similarly, Kant naturalizes violence within the order of being and 
considers inter-state warfare as a natural mechanism to regulate cosmic 
anarchy. Both nationally and internationally, politics rests on the idea of 
asocial sociability: human beings are naturally self-interested and jealous 
31. For a critical account of the endurance of imperial powers, see Jane Burbank 
and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2010).
 &KDUOHV7LOO\³5HÀHFWLRQVRQWKH+LVWRU\RI(XURSHDQ6WDWH0DNLQJ´LQ&KDUOHV
Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
UP, 1983), pp. 383 Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence (Berkeley, CA: 
Univ. of California Press, 1987); Bruce D. Porter, War and the Rise of the State: The Mili-
tary Foundations of Modern Politics (New York: Free Press, 1994); Thomas Ertman, Birth 
of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997).
33. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth 
Ecclesiasticall and Civil (1651), ed. and intro. Michael Oakeshott (Oxford: Basil Black-
well, 1960), pt. 2, chap. 1720, pp. 10936.
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vis-à-vis other human beings, which leads to some kind of competitive 
order. In turn, regulating the hostility between the individual parts takes 
the form of a central sovereign authority who rules over the whole (as for 
Hobbes). War is the process through which antagonism is transformed into 
VWDELOLW\ZLWKKXPDQFRQÀLFWVRPHKRZPLUURULQJQDWXUDOYLROHQFH
Nature has therefore once again used the incompatibility of human 
beings, even of great societies and state bodies . . . as a means to seek out 
in their unavoidable antagonism a condition of tranquility and safety, 
i.e. through wars, through the overstrained and never ceasing process 
of armament for them . . . nature drives them to what reason could have 
told them even without so much sad experience: namely to go beyond 
a lawless condition of savages and enter into a federation of nations.
34
So like Hobbes, Kant views warfare as a necessary evil to regulate the 
original violence that is our fundamental condition in the order of being. 
Only war will lead to the formation, destruction, and reconstitution of 
states until such time that national and international arrangements permit 
the creation of cosmopolitan commonwealths.35
Arguably, Hobbess and Kants conception of commonwealth shows 
the convergence of realism and cosmopolitanism in IR theory around 
notions of original, natural violence, which requires the imposition of an 
DUWL¿FLDOVRFLDOFRQWUDFWDQGOHJLWLPDWHVWKHELRSROLWLFDOSRZHURIWKHVRY-
ereignwhether at the level of a single state or a federation of nations. 
Liberal accounts of international affairs share realist-cosmopolitan con-
ceptions of the violent order of nature and fuse market with state power to 
police natural anarchy.
Therefore the only alternative account is to reject the claim that the 
order of being is foundationally violent and that concomitantly interna-
tional society is fundamentally anarchica global war of all against 
all that mirrors the violent state of nature at the national level. That 
is because the most primary ties, bonds, and connections between human 
EHLQJV DUH QRW FRQ¿QHG WR QDWLRQDO ERUGHUV7KH\ DUH WUDQVQDWLRQDO DQG
indeed universal: language, cultural customs, music, art, literary modes, 
fashions in manners and dress, as well as religion. Therefore, as Catherine 
34. Immanuel Kant, Idea for a Universal History (1784), in Anthropology, History, 
Education, trans. R. Louden and G. Zöller (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007), pp. 107
120, quotation at p. 114.
35. Ibid., pp. 11415.
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Pickstock points out, one reason why different countries do not wage war 
all the time is the widely-diffused sense of shared culture and common 
sensibility which can stretch even across vast geographical distances.36 
Against the New Whigs, Edmund Burke emphasized traditioned asso-
ciation as the most universal mode of human interaction: 
Men are not tied to one another by papers and seals. They are led to asso-
ciate by resemblances, by conformities, by sympathies. It is with nations 
as with individuals. Nothing is so strong a tie of amity between nation 
and nation as correspondence in laws, customs, manners, and habits of 
life. They have more than the force of treaties in themselves. They are 
obligations written in the heart. They approximate men to men, without 
their knowledge, and sometimes against their intentions. The secret, 
unseen, but irrefragable bond of habitual intercourse holds them together 
even when their perverse and litigious nature sets them to equivocate, 
VFXIÀHDQG¿JKWDERXWWKHWHUPVRIWKHLUZULWWHQREOLJDWLRQV37
In other words, Burke inverts the modern primacy of rights and contracts 
by arguing that the mutual moral obligations of interpersonal relations are 
more primary than abstract, formal, and procedural standards linked to 
activities for either state-administrative or market-commercial purposes. 
Crucially, this extends to ties across nations and sovereign states, which 
suggests that the family of nations and peoples embeds the society of 
states and markets.
Against both the realism of Hobbes and Herder and the cosmopolitan-




habit and creativity that blends nature with culturethe order of being 
with the order of knowing and making. In this manner, customs, man-
ners, and habits of life provide the bonds and ties that infuse the immanent 
36. Catherine Pickstock, Numbers of Power, Lines of Transition: The Decay of 
Metaphysics and the Loss of International Order, in Will Bain, ed., International Rela-
tions and the Medieval Imagination (London: Routledge, forthcoming in 2015).
37. Edmund Burke, Letters on a Regicide Peace (extract), in International Rela-
tions in Political Thought: Texts From the Ancient Greeks to the First World War, ed. 
Chris Brown, Terry Nardin, and Nicholas Rengger (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002), 
pp. 292300, quotation at p. 296.
38. Ibid., p. 293.
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political order with a transcendent, cosmic outlook. Such a Burkean per-
VSHFWLYHVKLIWVWKHIRFXVIURPDQDUWL¿FLDOFRPPRQZHDOWKWKDWFRHUFLYHO\
regulates natural violence to a natural-cultural commonwealth that upholds 
peace beyond rivalry. It is the principle of association that underpins the 
alternative to both biopolitical coercion and impersonal contract.
Based on associative commonwealths, globalization has the potential 
to promote a plural search for the shared common good and substantive 
ends that can mediate between the individual and the collective will and 
thus help bind together members of diverse bodies and polities. It chal-
lenges the view that the incommensurability of rival values either requires 
FHQWUDO VRYHUHLJQ SRZHU WR DUELWUDWH FRQÀLFW RU HOVH OHDGV WR D IUDJLOH
modus vivendia situation in which peaceful coexistence merely regu-
lates a violent state of nature that rules out the ontological possibility of a 
just, harmonious order.
To suggest that competing values are incommensurable (especially in 
the late modern context of multiculturalism and the global clash of fanati-
cal faiths) is to assume that different values have equal claim to normative 
validity and that no hierarchical ordering can command popular assent. 
In the absence of higher-order universal principles from which particular 
norms derive their moral character, general values such as freedom, equal-
LW\DQGVHFXULW\FRQVWLWXWHWKHLURZQIRXQGDWLRQDQG¿QDOLW\+RZHYHUQR
value is valuable in itself or as such, not even ancient liberties or modern 
human rights. Values are valuable because they originate from an invalu-
able source and because they are ordered toward an equally invaluable 
enda transcendent principle that provides an intelligible account of what 
is valuable and how it ought to be valued, blending the empirical with the 
normative. For example, the sanctity of life and the dignity of the human 
person underpin the principles of liberality like fair detention, fair trial or 
habeas corpus that are central to notions of freedom, equality, and security. 
Crucially, this argument shifts the focus away from unilateral prac-
tices centered on self-interest and individual entitlements toward more 
reciprocal arrangements that rest on the balance between rights and 
responsibilitieswhat the English IR scholar Martin Wight called the link 
between common interest and common obligation.39 Connected with 
this point about the common good is the re-invention of constitutional 
corporatism in a more plural guise against both market individualism and 
39. Martin Wight, Power Politics, 2nd ed., ed. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad 
(Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, 1986), pp. 29394.
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state collectivism, in particular the principle of mixed government and 
the role of corporate bodies in both politics and the economy. This non-
statist corporatism diffuses sovereign power away from the institutions 
of the central state and the free market by promoting the constitutional 
recognition and political participation of mediating institutions such 
as professional associations in both the public and the private sector, 
manufacturing and trading guilds, cooperatives, trade unions, voluntary 
organizations, universities, free cities, and indeed old empires in a new 
guise.
&RQFOXGLQJ5HÀHFWLRQ
More so than the formalist separation of powers that ends in institutional 
stalemate or the primacy of executive power, the constitutionalist prin-
ciple of mixed government can help balance the three branches while at 
the same time upholding the autonomy of both individuals and corporate 
bodies within the free, shared social spacethe realm of civic institu-
tions and civil society that is more primary than either the national state 
or the transnational market associated with the modern secularist settle-
ment. As Wight put it, in modernity [s]overeignty had indeed passed to 
different states, by social contracts, but the original unity of the human 
race survived.40 It is the task of the West and its worldwide partners to 
preserve, renew, and extend the social and cultural ties in which individu-
als, groups, and institutions are embedded both nationally and globally.
An imaginative approach to international affairs by the West would 
call to abandon false and dysfunctional either-ors in favor of strangely 
SRVVLEOHSDUDGR[HV1RW3DFL¿FRU(XURSHVWDWHRUPDUNHWUHOLJLRQRUWKH
secular, or nationalism versus globalization. Instead, intimate reciprocities 
LQHYHUZLGHQLQJFLUFOHVIURP\RXUVWUHHW WRWKHSODQHWFDQGLPO\UHÀHFW
a family of nations and peoples in which states and markets serve the 
needs of persons, communities, and associations within and across state 
borders. Compared with the logic of abstraction that underpins realist, 
liberal, and cosmopolitan ideas, such an associationist alternative would 
link political to economic and ecological purpose in the name of mutuality, 
reciprocity, and social recognition.
The idea of commonwealth can help build multi-national associations 
of peoples. Linked to this is the notion of covenantpeople, partly under 
40. Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions, ed. Gabriele Wight 
and Brian Porter (Leicester: Leicester UP, 1991), p. 38.
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religious inspiration, who are covenanted to one another in the interest 
RIPXWXDOEHQH¿W)DUIURPEHLQJXWRSLDQUHODWLRQDOFRYHQDQWVFDQEDO-
ance the freedom and dignity of the person with mutual obligations and 
interpersonal relationships. Against the impersonalism of state and mar-
ket, covenantal arrangements enable people to partake of both power and 
wealth in the sense of greater democratic participation and a shared mate-
rial and spiritual well-being for all.
The West can either fracture and split permanently, abandoning inter-
national relations to unipolar hegemony or multipolar anarchy. Or else 
LWFDQUHGH¿QHLWVFRYHQDQWDOGHVWLQ\DVSLULQJWREHDJHQXLQHEHDFRQWR
the rest of the world and to cooperate with other nations toward the same, 
VKDUHGHQGVRIYLUWXHKRQRUDQGPXWXDOÀRXULVKLQJ
